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In 1992 Jones and Bixler (Mission Financing to Realign National Defense, JAI Press) 
examined different factors (internalities, externalities) within the federal budget process 
and identified certain tendencies, trends, and relationships in congressional control over 
defense through the budget process. This study occurred at the end of the Cold War. The 
national security situation of the United States has been quite different over the past 20 
years. Further, the federal budget context has been different as mandatory spending has 
taken a larger share and budget surpluses were achieved and lost. Debates over the right 
level of spending are increasing now as both fiscal and security issues are driving 
Congress, Department of Defense (DoD), and the White House to reexamine defense 
spending. This project examines the assertions in Jones and Bixler to determine if they 
remain valid through comparisons of their Cold War data with data collected during a 
relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Jones and Bixler (1992) provided a broad look at Cold War era patterns of 
congressional control over defense through the budget process. Their study occurred at 
the end of the Cold War. The national security situation of the United States has changed 
significantly over the past 20 years. Further, the federal budget context has been different 
as mandatory spending takes a larger share and budget surpluses were achieved and lost. 
Debates over the right level of spending are increasing now as both fiscal and security 
issues are driving Congress, Department of Defense (DoD), and the White House to 
reexamine defense spending. This project extends Jones and Bixler's research 
incorporating the post-Cold War period while examining their assertions determining if 
they remain valid during a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period 
of war (post 9/11 to 2011). 
With defense budget pressures increasing due to future Federal budget 
constraints, understanding the historical data and trends will help the DoD understand 
congressional control measures. During the period of relative peace, the DoD budget 
authority decreased due to a general defense drawdown and for the period of war, the 
DoD budget authority increased. This thesis will utilize the data from these two periods 
extending and comparing to Jones and Bixler’s Cold War data analyzing congressional 
control measures of defense budgets. The objective of this thesis will be to determine if 
certain assertions by Jones and Bixler remain valid beyond their period of study. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question addressed by this thesis is to determine whether the 
trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid beyond their period of 
study. To answer this question we will compare the levels of congressional control to 
defense budgets during a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period of 
war (post 9/11 to 2011). 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
Jones and Bixler (1992) researched and analyzed defense spending during the 
forty-year period of the Cold War era, identifying trends between defense spending and 
congressional control. Data analyzed by Jones and Bixler (1992) "indicated that 
congressional micromanagement of the DoD budget has increased since the 1950s, and 
particularly since the late 1960s and 1970s" (p. 123). To support their assertion, Jones 
and Bixler analyzed different causal factors and congressional control methods to explain 
this increase in oversight and control of the DoD budget by Congress. 
Causal factors investigated include: (1) committee and budget reforms 
within Congress; (2) public attitude toward defense spending; (3) growth 
and shrinkage of the defense budget; (4) increased spending on 
uncontrollables within the federal budget and deficit control pressures; and 
(5) growth of Congressional staff size and expertise in defense matters 
(Jones & Bixler, 1992, p. 123). 
Some of the congressional control methods analyzed include: (1) number of pages in 
Defense Authorization Bills, Defense Appropriation Bills, Armed Services Committee 
Reports on DoD Authorization Bills, and Defense Appropriations Committee Reports on 
the DoD Appropriations Bills; (2) number of General Provisions in the Defense 
Authorization and Appropriation Bills; (3) the number of Defense Hearings before the 
Senate and House Armed Services Committees and (4) congressional staff sizes. Jones 
and Bixler's data covers a period from 1960–1991, the Cold War era. 
This thesis extends Jones and Bixler's research and compares their Cold War era 
research to two distinct periods: (1) a period of relative peace (post-Cold War to 
9/11/2001); and (2) a period of war (post 9/11/2001 to 2011). To ensure comparability 
and consistency of data analysis (to the best extent possible), this thesis replicated Jones 
and Bixler's methods and data sources. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis is a comparative analysis of congressional control of the Department 
of Defense spanning three specific time periods: 
• Jones and Bixler's Cold War Data 
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• Post-Cold War to 11 September 2001 (relative period of peace) 
• Post 11 September 2001 to Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 (period of war) 
This thesis will extend the data collected by Jones and Bixler (1992) through FY 
2011 in order to evaluate whether the defense spending and congressional control 
relationships Jones and Bixler asserted remain valid during a relative period of peace, a 
period of war, the entire time period (1960–2011), and the last 20 years (1992–2011). 
This thesis will specifically analyze the following items which are similar to those 
used by Jones and Bixler: 
• Number of pages in Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills 
• Number of pages in the House and Senate Armed Services Committee 
Reports (HASC, SASC) on Defense Authorization Bills 
• Number of pages in the House and Senate Appropriations Committee 
Reports (HAC, SAC) on Defense Appropriations Bills 
• HASC and SASC total number of hearings and number of witnesses 
• Number of Defense related General Provisions 
• Size of congressional staff 
Analysis will determine whether the trends and assertions observed by Jones and 
Bixler with respect to the DoD budget during the Cold War era remain valid beyond their 
period of study. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents background information on the congressional budget process, 
origins of congressional control, methods of congressional control utilized, and different 
ways congressional oversight can be measured. 
Chapter III will present selected data from Jones and Bixler (1992) extended to 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. The subsequent data analysis will compare Jones and Bixler's 
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Cold War-centric data to two specific time periods: a relative period of peace (post-Cold 
War through 11 September 2001) and a period of war (Post 9/11 through FY 2011). 
Chapter IV will present results of the data analysis and recommendations for 
further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE POWER TO CONTROL THE BUDGET 
1. Constitutional Origins 
To understand how congressional controls affect the Department of Defense 
budget, it is important to understand the history of the congressional budgeting process 
and how the struggle for control of the budget between the executive and legislative 
branches led to the current budget process. 
The DoD budget proposal from the President is never identical to the budget as 
appropriated by Congress. The primary reason for this difference stems from Article I, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution which places the power to enact taxes and to spend the 
monies raised by taxes with Congress while Article I, Section 9 specifies that the only 
way money can be drawn from the Treasury would be through the "Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law" (U.S. Const., art. I, §9). According to Hamilton (2001), the 
reason for this is clear: 
The framers of the Constitution, mindful of "taxation without 
representation" suffered by colonists under the British crown, took care to 
specify in the Constitution that the ultimate power to tax and spend resides 
in the hands of the legislative branch—which is closer to the people—not 
the Executive Branch (para. 5). 
Article I, Section 8 also provides Congress with the power to raise and support armies 
and to provide and maintain a Navy, which can result in budgetary conflict when 
Congress does not agree with executive branch recommendations. The differences in 
priorities between the executive and legislative branches over defense, combined with the 
external influence of congressional constituencies and lobbyists, ensure that the 
President's budget proposal and the actual congressional appropriations will never be 
identical (Schick, 1975). 
Although the Constitution establishes the constitutional powers of Congress over 
taxes and spending, it does not establish any requirement for a budget from the executive  
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branch, nor does it specify the methodology for executing budgetary legislation. The two 
statutes that fill these roles are the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 
2. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) established the statutory 
requirement that the President submit a budget to Congress on the first day of each 
regular session that includes "estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary 
in his judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year" (P.L. 67-
13, 1921, §201). It also established the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), later reorganized 
into the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by Executive Order 11541 in 1970, to 
assist the President in budget preparation. "Under any interpretation, establishment of the 
BOB in 1921 and the crucial tasking of the President to prepare and submit a budget to 
Congress shifted the power to the executive" (Jones, Candreva, & DeVore, 2012, p. 51). 
To mitigate this power shift to the executive branch, P.L. 67-13 also established 
the General Accounting Office as Congress’ auditing agency to act "independent of the 
executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of 
the United States" (P.L. 67-13, 1921, §301). The GAO's mission "is to support Congress 
in meeting constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure 
the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people" 
(About GAO, 2012). 
3. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) was 
passed by Congress on 12 July 1974 in response to continuing budget conflicts between 
the executive and legislative branches. Specifically, Congress felt that their "power of the 
purse" was being challenged by President Nixon's impoundment strategy in the early 
1970s (Hogan, 1985). Although the use of impoundment goes back to President Jefferson 
in 1803 (he chose to delay spending $50,000 appropriated for the purchase of gunboats 
by over a year), it was President Nixon's usage that provided the spark for Congress to 
pursue legislation curtailing this power (Damon, 1973). In addition to curtailing the 
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power of impoundment, P.L. 93-344 provided the foundation for the current 
congressional budget process, specified the requirement for an annual Budget Resolution, 
established the House and Senate Budget Committees, and established the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO). 
In the congressional budget process, the Budget Resolution "sets aggregate 
spending and taxing totals and estimates the resulting deficit or surplus. It also sets 
spending totals by functional areas, e.g., defense, transportation, and so on." (Jones, et al, 
2012, p. 15) The Budget Resolution (once adopted by Congress) acts as a framework to 
guide the appropriations committees and subcommittees through the process that 
provides the individual appropriations bills and acts as a measuring stick for CBO 
analysis. 
The Congressional Budget Office was established to facilitate the aggregation of 
budgetary information for congressional committees independent of the executive branch. 
This included:  
(1) information with respect to the budget, appropriation bills, and other 
bills authorizing or providing budget authority or tax expenditures, (2) 
information with respect to revenues, receipts, estimated future revenues 
and receipts, and changing revenue conditions, and (3) such related 
information as such Committees may request (P.L. 93-344, 1974, 88 Stat 
304). 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 played a crucial role in 
the establishment of a formal budgeting process and were instrumental in the delineation 
of budgetary power between the executive and legislative branches of government. P.L. 
93-344 placed the budgetary planning function squarely in Congress through 
establishment of the House and Senate Budget Committees, established their power to 
modify the executive budget proposal, and established the CBO as Congress' powerful 
analytical arm to assist congressional members in their budget negotiations with the 
executive branch (President and OMB) (Jones et al, 2012). 
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B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS OVERVIEW 
As a consequence of P.L. 93-344, a specific process was put into place to allow 
Congress to evaluate the President's budget proposal and formalize the procedures that 
Congress could utilize to modify the proposal if Congress felt that it was necessary to 
meet the country's budgetary needs for the fiscal year. 
Although the budget process is extremely fluid and no two fiscal years will be 
exactly the same, Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), as 
amended, established a timetable (Table 1) that is intended to keep Congress on pace to 
complete all budgetary legislation by the start of the new fiscal year. 
When the President submits his budget proposal to Congress no later than the first 
Monday in February it signals the beginning of legislative consideration of the budget 
and the inevitable interaction between the executive branch and Congress. In the first of a 
series of steps, various committees and subcommittees evaluate the budget proposal and 
submit their "views and estimates" on expenditures and receipts to the House and Senate 
Budget Committees. 
These “views and estimates” reports of House and Senate committees 
provide the Budget Committees with information on the preferences and 
legislative plans of congressional committees regarding budgetary matters 
within their jurisdiction (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010). 
House and Senate committees submit these reports to their respective House and Senate 
Budget Committees within six weeks of the President's budget proposal submission. The 
House and Senate Budget Committees then review this data, utilizing it to draft and 
markup a Budget Resolution on the budget. The Budget Resolution must be reported in 
the Senate by 1 April where it will be evaluated on the floor of the House and Senate with 
a deadline of 15 April for completion of action (P.L. 93-344, 1974, §300). 
The Budget Resolution represents a congressional budget plan that consists of 
spending and taxing targets that will serve as Congress' blueprint for the remainder of the 
budgeting process. It could also include reconciliation instructions that would affect 
changes to taxes or mandatory spending e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. 
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Table 1.   Congressional Budget Process Timetable (From: U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2008) 
Date Action 
First Monday in February President submits budget to Congress 
February 15 Congressional Budget Office submits economic and budget 
outlook report to Budget Committees 
Six Weeks after President 
submits budget 
Committees submit views and estimates to Budget 
Committees 
April 1 Senate Budget Committee reports budget resolution 
April 15 Congress completes action on budget resolution 
May 15 Annual appropriation bills may be considered in the House, 
even if action on budget resolution has not been completed 
June 10 House Appropriations Committee reports last annual 
appropriations bill 
June 15 Congress completes action on reconciliation legislation (if 
required by budget resolution) 
June 30 House completes action on annual appropriation bills 
July 15 President submits mid-session review of his budget to 
Congress 
October 1 Fiscal year begins 
 
In an ideal scenario Congress adopts the Budget Resolution prior to beginning 
action on the appropriations bills, signaling a shift to the appropriations process. 
However, if Congress has not completed action on the Budget Resolution by 15 May, 
annual appropriation bills can then be considered in the House. At the beginning of the 
appropriations process for the regular appropriations bills, the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) are allocated their spending ceilings as 
specified in a joint explanatory statement included in the budget resolution conference 
report. The HAC and SAC sub-allocate this amount among their respective 
appropriations subcommittees, providing guidance regarding their individual spending 
ceilings. Each House and Senate subcommittee has responsibility for only one regular 
appropriations bill (e.g. defense, homeland security, agriculture, etc.). 
Each subcommittee is responsible to draft, markup, and report their appropriations 
bill to the full HAC and SAC who will then scrutinize the bills. After the HAC and SAC 
have completed their deliberation the bills are passed on to the floor for evaluation, 
scrutiny, debate, and amendment by the full House and Senate. Once their respective 
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chambers pass the bills, a conference committee is held that compares the two bills and 
works to resolve the differences between the two versions. After all differences are 
resolved the bills go back before the full House and Senate for a vote. Before the bill can 
be presented to the President for signature into law, both the House and Senate must pass 
identical legislation (U.S. Const., art. I, §7). As a guideline, appropriations bills are 
supposed to be out of the House by 30 June and enacted prior to the beginning of the new 
fiscal year. However, if all the appropriations bills are not enacted by 30 September then 
Congress must pass a Continuing Resolution Appropriation (CRA) to cover the 
timeframe from the start of the new fiscal year to the expected date that the remaining 
appropriations will be enacted. 
The purpose of a CRA is to provide governmental agencies and programs with the 
budget authority to continue to operate during the new fiscal year until the regular 
appropriations bills have been enacted. In general, a CRA provides temporary funding to 
governmental agencies and programs at a funding level equal to the previous fiscal year. 
The third major appropriation measure is the supplemental appropriation. The 
supplemental appropriation differs from the CRA and regular appropriation bills in that it 
will actually serve to increase the funding of regular appropriations already enacted in the 
fiscal year government budget. Supplemental appropriations are normally in response to 
an unanticipated need that occurs within the fiscal year that was not budgeted and/or 
cannot be met by the current regular appropriations. Commonly this need derives from a 
natural disaster such as a flood or hurricane or an emergent defense need such as 
contingency operations or the immediate response to 9/11.  
After the conference report to resolve differences between the House and Senate 
appropriations bill is passed, the bill goes to the President to be signed into public law. At 
this point the President can sign the bill into law, veto the bill and send it back to 
Congress with his objections for reconsideration, or do nothing. If the President chooses 
to do nothing, the bill will be considered as if it were signed into law after a period of 10 
days. If the President sends the bill back to the Congress for reconsideration, Congress 
can put it to a vote and if two-thirds approve then the bill becomes law. 
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C. WHY CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING 
There are numerous reasons why Congress is actively involved with control and 
oversight of the defense budget. The main reason is to ensure accountability for the use of 
taxpayer dollars for national defense. However, politics is a key driving force developing 
the defense budget with many legislators attempting to influence the process (Stockton, 
1995). Some of the reasons analyzed are: (1) to influence national strategy; (2) 
authorization committee desire to micromanage defense; (3) to influence politics; (4) 
parochialism; and (5) political ambitions (Lindsay, 1990; Mayer, 1993; Stockton, 1995). 
1. National Strategy Influence 
National strategy influences are the activities Congress engages in from oversight 
through the committee system. “The Legislative Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601) stipulated that 
congressional committees should exercise continuous watchfulness over those actions of 
the executive branch that fall within their jurisdiction” (Lindsay, 1990, p. 9). The HASC 
and SASC are the primary means in which Congress oversees the DoD. Theoretically, the 
details of the defense budget should be developed in a top-down fashion. After an 
analytical study of U.S. national security policy and needs, the decision is made on the 
size, capabilities, and force structure, funding levels for the armed forces is established, 
and programs necessary to execute the national security objective(s) are enacted 
(Stockton, 1995). The reality is the executive branch provides the basis for the defense 
budget funding levels request to Congress for achieving defense policy goals. Congress 
can and often does alter the executive branch’s request while legislating the individual 
program’s funding levels sometimes without considering the impact to future national 
security goals (Stockton, 1995). Programming disputes may also reflect broader 
disagreements between Congress and the executive branch over direction of defense 
policy. This can take three forms: “The overall level of defense budget, allocation of 
defense spending among different defense programs, and the priority of individual 
programs to fund” (Mayer, 1993, 298). Congress can influence the direction of national 
security and defense policy through authorizations and appropriations. The power to 
make line item changes is where Congress gains the ability to influence both overall 
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national strategy and particular defense activities. The executive branch can set the 
national security vision, but Congress can directly influence and impact the vision with 
the power of the purse. 
2. Congressional Committee Micromanagement 
The HASC and SASC are often viewed as micromanaging the defense budget 
requests and execution. The HASC and SASC are responsible for DoD authorization. 
Authorization addresses the creation, continuation or cancellation of an agency or 
program and the definition, scope, and limits of its powers and responsibilities, but does 
not provide agencies with budget authority, although they may suggest or authorize 
spending levels. Additionally, the HASC and SASC are empowered with the legislative 
oversight of the DoD. The HAC and SAC are responsible for DoD appropriation. 
Appropriations provide an agency with the legal power to incur financial obligations and 
make payments (outlays). The appropriation process allocates budget authority to 
authorized programs (Lee, Johnson, Joyce, 2008). What are some of the reasons for 
Congress’ micromanagement of the DoD? 
One of the reasons Congress increased administrative controls in the late 1980s 
was due to a mistrust of the Pentagon (Mayer, 1993). Congress had decided detailed 
direction was and still is necessary due to DoD's ability to evade general guidance, 
requests, and restrictions (Mayer, 1993). Lindsay (1990) argues, “the Pentagon is far 
better adjusted than most bureaucracies to resist congressional oversight” (p.14). With 
Congress having the ability from legislative oversight to force compliance on the DoD it 
would bring about the control measures the legislators wanted. Even with improved DoD 
compliance, the 1980s level of oversight control legislation still survives. 
Congress will reduce oversight control of the DoD only in very unusual times of 
high uncertainty and imminent threat to national security. However, once Congress 
understands the uncertainty and imminent threat levels, the traditional congressional 
control measures are put back into place (Candreva & Jones, 2005). 
Another factor is the constant battle between congressional politics versus 
Pentagon politics. Each has a desired end state goal with long institutional memories, in 
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some cases their political agendas do not align. The biggest factor in the Congress versus 
Pentagon politics debate is money and the programs to spend it on. The potential for 
thousands of units of military hardware and billions of dollars for programs leads to many 
lobbyist groups all vying for their piece of the defense budget pie. Legislators and 
lobbyists will politic, gaining coalitions and passing authorization and appropriation 
levels they think is necessary. Those numbers might differ from what the Pentagon thinks 
the DoD requirements and needs are, hence the high stakes of Congress versus Pentagon 
politics (Stockton, 1995).  
One more factor is that in the mid-1960s, defense authorization bills had broad 
funding categories while House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees 
completed specific funding to individual programs. Since then, the number of line items 
in the defense budget has significantly increased reinforcing the perception of HASC and 
SASC micromanagement of programs vice focusing on more long range national security 
policy (Stockton, 1995). The end result is the growth of HASC and SASC 
micromanagement of the defense budget from line item budgeting as Congress influences 
the political nature of the budgetary process. 
3. Political Influence 
Legislators will “use strategy as a political tool to win votes on budget legislation, 
both within committees and in Congress as a whole” (Stockton, 1995, p. 237). Budgeting 
is a political process with compromises and coalitions built from the exchange of votes 
on various issues and programs. The defense budget is the largest part of the 
discretionary portion of the federal budget. Members of Congress will compete with each 
other and the executive branch over national strategy, funding levels, and individual 
programs to champion (Stockton, 1995). The President and the DoD know who the 
powerful political players are on the Hill and will target them appropriately in the effort 
of getting their respective national security and program goals funded at the requested 
levels. In Washington DC, Congress, through the HASC and SASC, has the political 




Members of Congress want to show their constituents that they are looking out for 
their interests. Parochialism encourages legislators to add or reduce programs through 
line item budgetary power. From parochialism, potentially unnecessary spending could 
be enacted adding waste to the defense budget. Second, alternative programs will have to 
be discredited and their spending levels reduced or eliminated. The alternative program 
has their supporters who will counter the budgetary assault resulting in more hearings, 
reports, oversight, and increase the overall congressional control and micromanagement 
of the defense budget (Lindsay, 1990). 
An example is the B-2 Bomber program that was reduced and eventually 
cancelled by Congress which then took the funding the President requested for the B-2 
and re-apportioned it to other programs in different districts Congress deemed were of 
greater value (Lindsay, 1990). The competition for those dollars among members of 
Congress to bring home the money (jobs) to their home districts and voting constituents 
is very important to them and their reelection prospects. The reality of personal incentives 
from parochialism leads to increases in congressional control as they fight for scarce 
resource dollars thru lengthy hearings and documentation either justifying the program or 
defending it. 
5. Political Ambitions 
Lastly are the political ambitions of members of Congress. Members of Congress 
want to improve their station and power. Members of Congress want to win reelections 
gaining seniority, increase their political influence on the Hill, and win appointment to 
more powerful posts and committees. One of the ways to establish their congressional 
credentials is thru policy oversight. Policy oversight is the review, monitoring, and 
supervision of the federal government. Congressional members will utilize their 
legislative power to “reign in” programs Congress deems are not following the policies 
and procedures enacted by Congress. Policy oversight in many instances will increase 
congressional control of the budgetary process by lengthening the process thru 
hearings/documentation and add direction for the DoD with policy, procedures, and laws. 
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In addition, as members of Congress look to climb the ladders of power on the hill, those 
in power will not give up their positions of influence within Congress without a fight. 
One of the ways members of Congress will attempt to influence their fellow legislators is 
with oversight. Hence there is a personal incentive for members of Congress to conduct 
in oversight activities as they attempt to protect and add to their political powerbase 
(Lindsay, 1990). 
D. HOW CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING 
There are a very direct methods Congress will use for implementing control 
measures and oversight for the defense budget. “Strong incentives are present for 
Congress to actively micromanage defense policy and budgets, and congressional rules 
and procedures provide many means by which to control the DoD through authorization, 
appropriation, and oversight” (Candreva & Jones, 2005, p. 3–4). Candreva and Jones 
assert that Congress uses the following methods to control the DoD: line item budgeting, 
earmarked funds, reprogramming and transfer restrictions, restricting access to funds 
pending compliance, formal and informal information gathering, 
reviews/audits/investigations, structural requirements placed on programs, and reporting 
requirements (2005, 105–122). The methods Congress uses to directly control defense 
spending that this paper will discuss are a combination of line item budgeting, formal and 
informal information collection coupled with governing laws and regulations. 
1. Line Item Budgeting 
One of the most direct ways Congress can dictate the details of the defense budget 
is from line item budgeting. The executive branch’s defense budget requests the levels of 
category and program funding. With line item budgeting, Congress can take categories of 
requested defense spending breaking it down into individual programs for a line-by-line 
program funding level. Congress can increase, decrease, or leave the spending levels at 
requested budgetary levels, a powerful control measure. Programs can have no funding 
appropriated essentially killing the program, increased or decreased funding levels 
providing more or less spending in certain congressional districts. Line item control 
enables Congress to directly impact the President’s requests with a program-by-program 
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review and modification if Congress deems necessary, however, this has led to an 
increase in congressional control as “well over 60% of Pentagon line item requests are 
changed by each chamber” (Art, 1985, p. 228). 
2. Formal and Informal Information Collecting 
The HASC and SASC will conduct formal information gathering and analysis 
from hearings, documentation, audits, accounting requirements, reports, and 
investigations. Informal information will be collected from DoD staff, government 
officials, and defense industry experts. The information gained from formal and informal 
sources is a key to the methods of congressional oversight implemented (Candreva & 
Jones, 2005). The information gained comes at a price in time and dollars as both 
subcommittees (HASC and SASC) functions overlap heavily but remain uncoordinated in 
their actions (Candreva & Jones, 2005). Information is used for line item budgeting, but 
the number of restrictions, conditions, and directions Congress requires of the DoD has 
been increasing to satisfy Congress’ control measures as defense spending levels 
increased (Mayer, 1993). The amount of information required by Congress from formal 
methods justifies the defense budgetary levels while providing proof of compliance with 
congressional control requirements. Additionally, Congress has to update, add, or remove 
laws and regulations for the DoD (Mayer, 1993). 
Another factor for increased control is the amount of dollars contractually 
obligated at increasing levels for DoD programs. With individual programmed items 
potentially costing billions and entire programs costing hundreds of billions of dollars, 
Congress wants to govern and regulate the relationship between DoD and the defense 
industrial base to include contractual procurement. All of this congressional control gives 
the HASC and SASC more information but adds to the lengthy defense budgetary 
process. Lindsay argues that 
Congressional oversight of the DoD can be subdivided into three distinct 
types: fiscal (if the administration’s request for individual programs 
should be changed), management (spending money efficiently), and policy 
(whether programs accomplish their designated missions and if they make 
sense) (Lindsay, 1990, p. 10). 
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Chapter II looked at the methods of congressional power controls the defense 
budget, including the congressional budget process, why Congress controls defense 
spending, and the means Congress control utilizes. Chapter III will present and analyze 
data determining if the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid 
beyond their period of study. Chapter III will compare the levels of congressional control 
of defense budgets during the Cold War, a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 
9/11), and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011). 
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III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter II described some of the measures Congress utilizes to control defense 
through the budget process. Chapter III will present assertions by Jones and Bixler 
regarding congressional control of defense during the Cold War era. The data was 
extended, organized, presented, and analyzed comparing the Cold War to the relative 
period of peace (1992–2001) to the period of war (2001–2011). The analysis will have 
one of three results for each assertion by Jones and Bixler regarding each respective time 
period and the overall trend. The results for their assertions are: remains valid (data 
supports their assertion), invalid (data does not support), or declare neutral (data is 
inconclusive). 
Each analysis will include a linear regression on the data series covering the Cold 
War era, relative period of peace, period of war, the entire data series, and the last 20 
years. The figures included with each analysis include a trend line based on the 
regression analysis to graphically represent the overall trend during each time period. 
Jones and Bixler’s assertions fall into three general categories: legislative, 
oversight, and capacity. 
Legislative 
• Number of pages in Defense Authorization Bills 
• Number of pages in Defense Appropriation Bills 
• Number of pages in HASC Defense Authorization Reports 
• Number of pages in SASC Defense Authorization Reports 
• Number of pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Reports 
• Number of pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Reports 
• Number of General Provisions 
Oversight 
• Number of HASC/SASC Hearings 
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• Number of witnesses before the HASC/SASC 
Capacity 
• Number of congressional staff members 
A. NUMBER OF PAGES IN DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILLS 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) found a trend in increased use of statutory controls by 
Congress to control the DoD budget. "These data document a steady increase in the 
number of pages in defense authorization and appropriation legislation in the period 
1963–1991" (p. 49). The increase in the number of pages in defense authorization bills is 
likely from greater specificity in the annual DoD authorization bills complex language 
and an increase in the line-item subdivisions. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 2 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.1 (p. 49) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the authorization 
bills for FY 1994–2011 was determined by referencing the respective bills on the United 
States Government Printing Office website (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), opening the 
Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual bill signed into public law, and noting the page count. 
The page numbers for the FY 1992 and 1993 defense authorization bills were determined 
by referencing the respective public law in the United States Statues at Large publication 
and counting the actual pages. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and 
Bixler (1992) page counts for 1963–1969 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 2 shows the number of pages in the defense authorization bills for the years 
1963–2011. Figure 1 displays the defense authorization bills data broken down into three 
separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) 
represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a 
relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war. 
 
 21 
Table 2.   Number of Pages in Defense Authorization Bills (FY 1963–2011) (After: 
Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1963–1991; National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), FY 1992–1993; NDAA, FY 1994–2011) 













1963 1 1992 299 2002 384 
1964 2 1993 456 2003 305 
1965 1 1994 421 2004 436 
1966 3 1995 454 2005 389 
1967 5 1996 519 2006 423 
1968 3 1997 449 2007 439 
1969 4 1998 450 2008 602 
1970 10 1999 360 2009 888 
1971 10 2000 466 2010 656 
1972 9 2001 515 2011 637 
1973 7     
1974 19     
1975 11     
1976 16     
1977 15     
1978 17  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1979 19  Era of Peace of War 
1980 19 Mean 77.66 438.9 525.64 
1981 47 Median 17 452 439 
1982 36 R-Squared 0.67 0.20 0.60 
1983 46 Std Deviation 114.45 66.50 170.15 
1984 95 Trendline Slope 10.97 9.86 46.36 
1985 170     
1986 197 Trendline Slope (1963–2011) 14.97  
1987 265 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) 12.76  
1988 230     
1989 285     
1990 339     









Figure 1.   Number of Pages in Defense Authorization Bills (1963–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the defense authorization bills 
increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1963 
to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative 
period of peace, the total number of pages rate of increase slowed and for the period of 
war, the rate significantly increased. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the 
full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years (relative period of 
peace and period of war). 
The number of pages in the defense authorization bills for the Cold War increased 
at a rate of 10.97 pages per year while the relative period of peace increased at a slightly 
slower rate of 9.86 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. For the period 
of war the number of pages in defense authorization bills significantly increased at a rate 
of 46.36 pages per year (323% increase from Cold War levels) supporting Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years increased at 12.76 pages per year supporting Jones 


















































































pages per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase 
in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in defense 
authorization bills.  
B. NUMBER OF PAGES IN DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILLS 
1. Assertion 
Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the authorization 
bills is an indicator of the increased utilization of statutory controls by Congress to 
control DoD through the budget process, they make the same assertions regarding the 
number of pages in defense appropriation bills. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 3 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.1 (p. 49) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the defense 
appropriation bills for FY 1996–2011 was determined by referencing the respective bills 
on the United States Government Printing Office website (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), 
opening the PDF copy of the actual bill signed into public law, and noting the page count. 
The page numbers for the FY 1992–1995 defense appropriation bills were determined by 
referencing the respective public law in the United States Statues at Large publication 
and counting the actual pages. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and 
Bixler (1992) page counts for 1963–1969 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 3 shows the number of pages in the defense appropriation bills for the years 
1963–2011. Figure 2 displays the defense appropriation bills data broken down into three 
separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) 
represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a 
relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war. 
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4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the defense appropriation bills 
increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1963 
to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, for the relative period of peace 
the total number of pages decreased and for the period of war the rate of decrease stopped 
and the total number of pages plateaued. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid 
across the full 50-year period but it is neutral when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of pages in the defense appropriation bills for the Cold War increased 
at a rate of 1.73 pages per year. The rate of growth for the relative period of peace 
declined slightly at 0.62 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The 
period of war rate is essentially flat (negative 0.04 pages per year) not supporting Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion (neutral) due to the insignificant effect it had considering the 
volume of pages in defense appropriation bills. The assertion of a growing trend no 
longer holds (negative 0.35 pages per year) in the 20 year period since Jones and Bixler’s 
study. The overall historical trend (FY 1963–2011) marginally increased at 1.25 pages 
per year, as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase in 















Table 3.   Number of Pages in Defense Appropriation Bills (FY 1963–2011) (After: 
Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1963–1991; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1992–1995; 
DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1996–2011) 













1963 18 1992 67 2002 62 
1964 17 1993 72 2003 59 
1965 17 1994 67 2004 57 
1966 18 1995 61 2005 65 
1967 19 1996 47 2006 74 
1968 19 1997 89 2007 60 
1969 18 1998 49 2008 50 
1970 19 1999 64 2009 49 
1971 19 2000 74 2010 67 
1972 20 2001 55 2011 66 
1973 21     
1974 21     
1975 22     
1976 27     
1977 23     
1978 26  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1979 25  Era of Peace of War 
1980 27 Mean 31.97 64.5 60.9 
1981 28 Median 25 65.5 61 
1982 30 R-Squared 0.60 0.02 0.0003 
1983 34 Std Deviation 19.11 12.51 7.69 
1984 39 Trendline Slope 1.73 -0.62 -0.04 
1985 68     
1986 40 Trendline Slope (1963–2011) 1.25  
1987 98 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) -0.35  
1988 47     
1989 61     
1990 47     









Figure 2.   Number of Pages in Defense Appropriation Bills (1963–2011) 
C. NUMBER OF PAGES IN HASC DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REPORT 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, 
specifically the number of pages in HASC defense authorization committee reports, 
reveal a trend in increased use of nonstatutory budget controls by Congress to control the 
DoD budget. 
Nonstatutory budget controls are applied more frequently than statutory 
budget controls because they do not require the consent of Congress. As 
such, these controls appear to be more prone to use by members of 
Congressional committees seeking to support personal and constituent 
interests. (p. 56). 
According to Jones and Bixler (1992), "A review of trends in committee reports indicates 
an evolution from rather mundane, nondescriptive documents to specific guidelines for 
control" resulting in a "trend toward increased complexity and length of reports" (p. 62). 
Art (1985, p. 233) substantiated this assertion based on an evaluation of the defense 

































































According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increase in defense authorization 
committee report size is likely due to an increase in the number of titles within the 
authorization bills and an increase in the number of individual line items contained within 
each title (p. 63). 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 4 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.5 (p. 64) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the HASC defense 
authorization committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the 
respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and 
noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler 
(1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 4 shows the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee 
reports for the years 1965–2011. Figure 3 displays the HASC defense authorization data 
broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data 
series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green 













Table 4.   Number of Pages in HASC Defense Authorization Report (FY 1965–
2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1965–1991; HASC, FY 1992–2011) 













1965 63 1992 513 2002 740 
1969 91 1993 494 2003 612 
1970 176 1994 744 2004 552 
1971 95 1995 579 2005 938 
1972 107 1996 660 2006 552 
1973 115 1997 725 2007 712 
1974 132 1998 803 2008 670 
1975 132 1999 580 2009 683 
1976 185 2000 730 2010 708 
1977 169 2001 476 2011 637 
1978 150     
1979 163     
1980 186     
1981 171  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1982 228  Era of Peace of War 
1983 233 Mean 247.25 630.40 680.40 
1984 332 Median 180.5 620 676.5 
1985 399 R-Squared 0.77 0.04 0.002 
1986 431 Std Deviation 161.71 117.31 111.22 
1987 272 Trendline Slope 19.46 7.49 -1.48 
1988 399     
1989 486 Trendline Slope (1965–2011) 16.61  
1990 549 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) 3.33  













Figure 3.   Number of Pages in HASC Defense Authorization Report (1965–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization 
committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking 
across the entire 1965 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. 
However, for the relative period of peace the rate of increase slowed and for the period of 
war the number of pages plateaued with a slight decreasing rate. Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at 
the last 20 years. 
The number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee reports for 
the Cold War increased at a rate of 19.46 pages per year, but the relative period of peace 
rate of increase slowed to 7.49 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. 
For the period of war the rate of increase stopped and plateaued with a slightly decreasing 
rate of 1.48 pages per year. The reduction is insignificant considering the volume of the 
HASC defense authorization committee reports and did not support Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion (neutral). The last 20 years increased at 3.33 pages per year supporting Jones 

















































































pages per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase 
in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in HASC 
defense authorization committee reports. 
D. NUMBER OF PAGES IN SASC DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REPORT 
1. Assertion 
Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the HASC defense 
authorization committee report is indicative of the increased use of nonstatutory controls 
by Congress to control DoD through the budget process, they make the same assertions 
regarding the number of pages in SASC defense authorization committee reports. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 5 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.5 (p. 64) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the SASC defense 
authorization committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the 
respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and 
noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler 
(1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 5 shows the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee 
reports for the years 1965–2011. Figure 4 displays the SASC defense authorization 
committee data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. 
The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the 
second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) 






Table 5.   Number of Pages in SASC Defense Authorization Report (FY 1965–2011) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1965–1991; SASC, FY 1992–2011) 













1965 17 1992 429 2002 480 
1969 31 1993 416 2003 499 
1970 70 1994 341 2004 488 
1971 121 1995 323 2005 512 
1972 140 1996 422 2006 514 
1973 177 1997 455 2007 551 
1974 205 1998 490 2008 673 
1975 190 1999 477 2009 584 
1976 191 2000 489 2010 350 
1977 204 2001 473 2011 373 
1978 153     
1979 158     
1980 166     
1981 242  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1982 197  Era of Peace of War 
1983 222 Mean 212.58 431.50 502.40 
1984 432 Median 195.5 442 505.5 
1985 489 R-Squared 0.58 0.43 0.04 
1986 309 Standard Deviation 112.62 59.04 93.71 
1987 296 Trendline Slope 11.79 12.85 -6.10 
1988 228     
1989 194 Trendline Slope (1965–2011) 10.39  
1990 297 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) 6.17  













Figure 4.   Number of Pages in SASC Defense Authorization Report (1965–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization 
committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking 
across the entire 1965 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. 
However, for the relative period of peace the number of pages rate of increase accelerated 
slightly and for the period of war the rate of increase stopped, reversed, and had a 
decreasing rate. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period 
and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee reports for the 
Cold War increased at a rate of 11.79 pages per year. The relative period of peace 
increased at a slightly greater rate of 12.85 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The period of war has a decreasing rate of 6.10 pages per year not supporting 
Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, the period of war experienced a slower rate of 
increase until FY 2010–2011 as suddenly the number of pages significantly decreased by 
over 200 pages per report. Although there is not enough data to state conclusively that 










































































years increased at 6.17 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The 
overall historical trend (FY 1965–2011) increased at 10.39 pages per year as Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control 
exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization 
committee reports. 
E. NUMBER OF PAGES IN HAC DEFENSE APPROPRIATION REPORT 
1. Assertion 
Where we saw that the number of pages in HASC and SASC defense 
authorization committee reports were indicative of the increased use of nonstatutory 
controls by Congress to control DoD through the budget process, our attention now turns 
to the number of pages in the HAC and SAC defense appropriation committee reports. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 6 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.6 (p. 65) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the HAC defense 
appropriation committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the 
respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and 
noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler 
(1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 6 shows the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee 
reports for the years 1960–2011. Figure 5 displays the HAC defense appropriation 
committee report data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend 
lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, 
the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) 




Table 6.   Number of Pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Report (FY 1960–2011) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1991; HAC, FY 1992–2011) 













1960 83 1992 269 2002 379 
1961 74 1993 255 2003 382 
1964 70 1994 330 2004 341 
1965 51 1995 305 2005 427 
1968 67 1996 217 2006 367 
1969 68 1997 243 2007 351 
1970 102 1998 292 2008 493 
1971 119 1999 315 2009 570 
1972 139 2000 331 2010 476 
1973 256 2001 237 2011 637 
1974 239     
1975 171     
1976 358     
1977 226     
1978 387     
1979 446  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1980 493  Era of Peace of War 
1981 398 Mean 239.18 279.40 442.3 
1982 315 Median 253.5 280.5 404.5 
1983 259 R-Squared 0.49 0.005 0.624 
1984 298 Standard Deviation 128.26 40.9 100.04 
1985 299 Trendline Slope 10.03 0.95 26.10 
1986 401     
1987 324 Trendline Slope (1960–2011) 6.82  
1988 307 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) 15.60  
1989 223     
1990 251     










Figure 5.   Number of Pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Report (1960–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation 
committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking 
across the entire 1960 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, for the 
relative period of peace the rate of increase stopped and the number of pages has 
plateaued and for the period of war the rate of increase resumed rising significantly. 
Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains 
valid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee reports for the 
Cold War increased at a rate of 10.03 pages per year. The relative period of peace 
plateaus at a marginally increasing rate of 0.95 pages per year not supporting Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. The marginal increase is insignificant considering the volume of the 
HAC defense appropriation committee reports not supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion (neutral). The period of war has a significantly increasing rate of 26.10 pages 
per year (surpassing the Cold War rate of growth) supporting Jones and Bixler’s 













































































Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2011) increased at 6.82 pages 
per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase in the 
amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in the HAC defense 
appropriation committee reports. 
F. NUMBER OF PAGES IN SAC DEFENSE APPROPRIATION REPORT 
1. Assertion 
Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the HAC defense 
appropriation committee report is indicative of the increased utilization of nonstatutory 
controls by Congress to control the DoD budget, they make the same assertions regarding 
the number of pages in SAC defense appropriation committee reports. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 7 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.6 (p. 65) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the SAC defense 
appropriation committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the 
respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and 
noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler 
(1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 7 shows the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee 
reports for the years 1960–2011. Figure 6 displays the SAC defense appropriation 
committee reports data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend 
lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, 
the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) 





Table 7.   Number of Pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Report (FY 1960–2011) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1991; SAC, FY 1992–2011) 













1960 31 1992 391 2002 234 
1961 47 1993 357 2003 244 
1964 69 1994 403 2004 196 
1965 52 1995 385 2005 213 
1968 71 1996 221 2006 274 
1969 56 1997 165 2007 253 
1970 141 1998 159 2008 298 
1971 221 1999 163 2009 466 
1972 210 2000 151 2010 304 
1973 204 2001 160 2011 271 
1974 173     
1975 207     
1976 302     
1977 277     
1978 295     
1979 217  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1980 219  Era of Peace of War 
1981 227 Mean 205.79 255.50 275.30 
1982 137 Median 213.5 193 262 
1983 157 R-Squared 0.68 0.79 0.324 
1984 205 Standard Deviation 102.52 112.78 75.33 
1985 227 Trendline Slope 9.44 -33.06 14.16 
1986 363     
1987 373 Trendline Slope (1960–2011) 3.76  
1988 353 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) -0.86  
1989 311     
1990 343     










Figure 6.   Number of Pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Report (1960–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation 
committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking 
across the entire 1960 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, at the start 
of the relative period of peace there was a point of inflection and the number of pages 
significantly decreased. At the start of the period of war there was another inflection 
point, reversing the downward trend. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across 
the full 50-year period and is neutral when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports for the 
Cold War increased at a rate of 9.44 pages per year. In the relative period of peace during 
FY 1996–1997 there was a point of inflection (200 page reduction) resulting in a 
significantly decreasing rate of 33.06 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The period of war reversed the negative trend with a positive rate of increase 
(at an accelerated rate of increase compared to the Cold War) of 14.16 pages per year 
supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years was neutral (negative 0.86 









































































(FY 1960–2011) increased at 3.76 pages per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains 
valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with 
the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports. 
G. NUMBER OF HASC AND SASC HEARINGS 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, 
specifically the number of HASC and SASC hearings, indicate a trend in increased use of 
other forms of control (information gathering via hearings) by Congress to control the 
DoD budget (p. 71). 
Jones and Bixler also assert that the increase in the number of hearings can be 
explained by the expansion of the annual authorization process to cover more of the DoD 
budget and the propensity for individual members of the HASC and SASC to request 
more extensive testimony by "outside experts, witnesses, and consultants" (p. 72). 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Tables 8 and 9 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.8 
(p. 72) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the total number of HASC hearings 
and full committee hearings for FY 1997–2011 were derived from hearing schedules on 
the HASC website (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings). The data for the 
total number of SASC hearings and full committee hearings for FY 1999–2010 were 
derived from SASC hearing schedules on the SASC website 
(http://armedservices.senate.gov/hearings.cfm). Delineation between full committee 
hearings and total hearings was determined by opening up each individual hearing 
webpage, reading the hearing summary, and noting whether the full committee or a 
subcommittee met. There are holes in the data collected spread among the three periods 
of study as the authors could not locate the missing data points in the time available for 
the thesis. 
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3. Data Presentation 
Tables 8 and 9 show the total number of HASC and SASC hearings and total 
number of full committee hearings for fiscal years 1966–1972 and 1997–2011 
respectively. Figures 7 through 10 displays the HASC and SASC total hearings and full 
committee hearings data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend 
lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, 
the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) 
represents a period of war. 
Table 8.   Number of HASC and SASC Hearings (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 
1997–2011; SASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011) 
HASC and SASC Total Hearings 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC 
1966 17 24 1997 69  2002 64 56 
1967 17 20 1998 61  2003 65 57 
1968 11 15 1999 77 78 2004  54 
1969 26 18 2000 57 59 2005  50 
1970 26 17 2001 52 66 2006  53 
1971 30 20    2007 108 63 
1972 30 19    2008 67 56 
      2009 101 57 
      2010 63 54 
      2011 100  
         







  HASC SASC HASC SASC HASC SASC  
Mean 22.43 19.00 63.20 67.67 81.14 55.56  
Median 26 19 61 66 67 56  
R-Squared 0.69 0.13 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.01  
Standard Deviation 7.41 2.83 9.91 9.61 20.64 3.57  
Trendline Slope 2.86 -0.46 -3.80 -6.00 2.78 0.15  
        
  HASC SASC     
Trendline Slope (1966–2011) 1.51 1.05     




Table 9.   Number of HASC/SASC Full Committee Hearings (FY 1966–72, 1997–
2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 
1997–2011; SASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011) 
HASC and SASC Full Committee Hearings 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC 
1966 6 12 1997 17  2002 19 26 
1967 5 12 1998 15  2003 26 33 
1968 1 8 1999 24 40 2004  29 
1969 2 15 2000 16 35 2005  33 
1970 6 9 2001 13 38 2006  32 
1971 10 14    2007 46 43 
1972 5 8    2008 23 38 
      2009 35 40 
      2010 23 39 
      2011 47  
         







  HASC SASC HASC SASC HASC SASC  
Mean 5.00 11.14 17.00 37.67 31.29 34.78  
Median 5 12 16 38 26 33  
R-Squared 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.69  
Standard Deviation 2.94 2.85 4.18 2.52 11.50 5.56  
Trendline Slope 0.43 -0.25 -0.70 -1.00 1.69 1.68  
        
  HASC SASC     
Trendline Slope (1966–2011) 0.64 0.67     














Figure 7.   Total Number of HASC Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011) 
 


















































































































































Figure 9.   Total Number of SASC Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011) 
 
Figure 10.   Total Number of SASC Full Committee Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011) 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of HASC and SASC hearings increased 

















































































































































entire 1966 to 2011 period, (with limited data points) there was an overall increase in the 
number of hearings. However, the number of HASC and SASC hearings during the 
relative period of peace had a declining trend and for the period of war there was an 
increasing data trend. For the HASC, Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid as the 
number is greater today than it was during their period of study. For the SASC, Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion remains valid, as the number is greater today than it was during their 
period of study. The data analysis will be technically inconclusive regarding Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion from too few data points; however, a limited data analysis will be 
presented. 
The number of HASC hearings for the Cold War increased at a rate of 2.86 
hearings per year. The number of HASC hearings for the relative period of peace 
decreased at a rate of 3.80 hearings per year as the limited data does not support Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. The number of HASC hearings for the period of war increased at a 
rate of 2.78 hearings per year as the limited data supports Jones and Bixler’s assertion. 
The last 20 years increased at 2.13 hearings per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The overall limited historical data (FY 1966–2011) increased at 1.51 hearings 
per year. With limited data points, Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid (limited 
data supported) of Congress’s increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD 
with the number of HASC hearings. 
The number of SASC hearings for the Cold War slightly decreased at a rate of 
0.46 hearings per year. The number of SASC hearings for the relative period of peace 
decreased at a rate of 6.00 hearings per year as the limited data does not support Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. The number of SASC hearings for the period of war plateaued 
(neutral) at a rate of 0.15 hearings per year. The limited data does not support Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years decreased at 1.16 pages per year invalidating Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. The overall limited data (FY 1966–2011) increased at 1.05 
hearings per year. With limited data points, Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid 
(limited data supported) regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted 
over the DoD with the number of SASC hearings. 
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H. NUMBER OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE HASC AND SASC 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, 
specifically the number of witnesses brought before the HASC and SASC, reveal a trend 
in increased use of other forms of congressional budget controls by Congress to control 
the DoD budget. 
According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increase in the number of witnesses 
before the HASC and SASC between 1965 and 1984 is directly related to the increase in 
the number of defense related hearings (p. 77). Jones and Bixler also assert that the 
increase in the number of hearings can be explained by the expansion of the annual 
authorization process to cover more of the DoD budget and the propensity for individual 
members of the HASC and SASC to request more extensive testimony by "outside 
experts, witnesses, and consultants" (p. 72). 
Additionally, Jones and Bixler state that "another indicator of the new 
congressional propensity for delving into the specifics of the defense budget is the change 
in the quality or content value of the questions asked of defense witnesses by committee 
members and their staff" (p. 76). 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 10 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.9 (p. 75) 
and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of witnesses before the HASC 
for FY 1997–2011 was determined by reviewing the hearing schedules on the HASC 
website (http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings), opening up the individual 
hearing webpage, referencing the witness list, and categorizing the witnesses into three 
categories (DoD, Other Government, and Non-Government). The data for the number of 
witnesses before the SASC for FY 1997–2011 was determined by reviewing the hearing 
schedules on the SASC website (http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings.cfm), opening 
up the individual hearing webpage, referencing the witness list, and categorizing the  
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witnesses into the same three categories. There are holes in the data collected spread 
among the three periods of study as the authors could not locate the missing data points in 
the time available for the thesis. 
3. Data Presentation 
Table 10 shows the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC for Fiscal 
Years 1966–1972 and 1997–2011. The first data series (blue text) represents Jones and 
Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green text) represents a relative period of peace, 
and the third (red text) represents a period of war. 
4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC 
increased throughout the Cold War. If the data set is extrapolated and expanded looking 
across the entire 1966 to 2011 period, (with limited data points) there was an overall 
neutral effect in those 50 years. However, for the HASC and SASC, the number of 
witnesses during the relative period of peace has a declining trend and for the period of 
war there is an increasing trend. Jones and Bixler’s assertion is neutral across the full 50-
year period and invalid when looking at the last 20 years. The data analysis will be 
technically inconclusive regarding Jones and Bixler’s assertion from too few data points, 
however, a limited data analysis will be presented. 
The number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC for the Cold War increased 
at a rate of 16.46 witnesses per year. The relative period of peace decreased at a rate of 
18.20 witnesses per year as the limited data does not support Jones and Bixler’s assertion. 
The period of war has a slightly increasing rate of 3.35 witnesses per year as the limited 
data supports Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note are the different categories of 
witnesses and to what extent Congress utilized their expertise. In all but three years, DoD 
witnesses comprised over 50% and in four years they were over 70% of the total number 
of witnesses before the HASC and SASC. For the three time periods, the percentage of 
DoD witnesses has effectively plateaued (60%), other government witnesses have 
decreased (from 21% to 11%), and the non-government witnesses have increased (16% to 
29%). The last 20 years decreased at 5.32 witnesses per year invalidating Jones and 
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Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011) is slightly 
decreasing at 0.67 witnesses per year (limited data points) but Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion is neutral (limited data supported) regarding Congress’ increase in the amount 




Table 10.   Number of HASC and SASC Witnesses (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 
































 1966 155 51.67% 106 35.33% 39 13.00% 300 
1967 187 55.49% 68 20.18% 82 24.33% 337 
1968 134 81.71% 17 10.37% 13 7.93% 164 
1969 148 68.84% 47 21.86% 20 9.30% 215 
1970 201 61.85% 67 20.62% 57 17.54% 325 
1971 222 47.64% 89 19.10% 155 33.26% 466 
1972 233 74.20% 58 18.47% 23 7.32% 314  











1997 207 57.98% 73 20.45% 77 21.57% 357 
1998 178 63.35% 43 15.30% 60 21.35% 281 
1999 291 67.52% 57 13.23% 83 19.26% 431 
2000 166 61.25% 40 14.76% 65 23.99% 271 
2001 166 61.25% 40 14.76% 65 23.99% 271  







 2002 133 48.01% 28 10.11% 116 41.88% 277 
2003 157 72.02% 21 9.63% 40 18.35% 218 
2007 175 62.06% 41 14.54% 66 23.40% 282 
2008 105 56.15% 21 11.23% 61 32.62% 187 
2009 187 58.44% 37 11.56% 96 30.00% 320 
2010 126 72.41% 25 14.37% 23 13.22% 174 
2011 215 61.25% 67 19.09% 69 19.66% 351 












Mean DoD Witnesses 182.86 201.60 156.86 178.21 
Mean Other Govt Witnesses 64.57 50.60 34.29 49.74 
Mean Non Govt Witnesses 55.57 70.00 67.29 63.68 
Mean Total Number of Witnesses 303 322.2 258.43 291.63 
DoD Witnesses Trendline Slope 13.25 -9.40 3.77 -0.29 
Other Govt Witnesses Trendline Slope -1.86 -6.90 2.54 -0.70 
Non-Govt Witnesses Trendline Slope 5.07 -1.90 -2.95 0.32 
Total Number of Witnesses Trendline Slope 16.46 -18.2 3.35 -0.67 
Avg DoD Percentage, Total FY Witnesses 63.06% 62.27% 59.34% 62.27% 
Avg Other Govt Percentage, Total FY Witnesses 20.85% 15.70% 11.41% 16.56% 









Trendline Slope (1966–2011) -0.29 -0.70 0.32 -0.67 
Trendline Slope (1997–2011) -3.24 -1.01 -1.07 -5.32 
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I. NUMBER OF GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, 
specifically the number of general provisions in authorization and appropriation public 
laws, reveal a trend in increased use of other forms of congressional budget controls by 
Congress to control the DoD budget. 
According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increased number of reports, studies, 
and other actions requested by Congress from the DoD between 1970 and 1991 is 
evidence to support the assertion that control by Congress over the DoD has steadily 
increased since 1950 (p. 85). The reasoning behind the reporting requirements is a need 
by Congress to determine the status of programs and activities within the DoD (Johannes, 
1985, p. 589). According to Johannes (1985), although many reporting requirements have 
limited utility, "Regularly, the findings of studies were used to draft and defend bills or 
amendments, or to prepare speeches. Some of the measures became law" (p. 593). 
Essentially, the increased reporting requirements not only increased the burden on the 
DoD to provide reports to Congress concerning individual programs or appropriations, 
they may have also served to feed the increase in overall size of legislation during the 
same period. 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 11 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.12 (p. 
78) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of general provisions to 
DoD authorization and appropriation public laws for FY 1992–2011 was determined by 
referencing the respective public law in the U.S. Congress United States Statutes at Large 
publication and recording the actual page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, 
the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1970–1980 were verified using the same 
methodology. Although there were some minor differences in page counts between the 
authors' data and Jones and Bixler's data, the authors chose to keep Jones and Bixler's 
published data to ensure consistency with other published data sources. However, the 
authors did correct arithmetic errors in the table when discovered. 
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3. Data Presentation 
Table 11 shows the number of general provisions for the years 1970–2011. Figure 
7 displays the number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation 
public laws broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The 
first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second 
(green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a 
period of war. 
Table 11.   Number of General Provisions (FY 1970–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 
1992, FY 1970–1991; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1992–1995; DoD 
Appropriations Act, FY 1996–2011; NDAA, FY 1992–1993; NDAA, FY 1994–
2011) 













1970 64 1992 300 2002 291 
1971 70 1993 298 2003 250 
1972 69 1994 285 2004 245 
1973 73 1995 285 2005 289 
1974 87 1996 285 2006 312 
1975 87 1997 259 2007 233 
1976 96 1998 261 2008 247 
1977 87 1999 257 2009 225 
1978 106 2000 302 2010 246 
1979 109 2001 351 2011 199 
1980 121     
1981 129     
1982 150  Cold War Relative Period Period 
1983 170  Era of Peace of War 
1984 223 Mean 146.23 288.30 253.70 
1985 192 Median 125 285 246.5 
1986 217 R-Squared 0.92 0.027 0.390 
1987 237 Standard Deviation 67.22 27.8 34.11 
1988 236 Trendline Slope 9.90 1.51 -7.04 
1989 216     
1990 207 Trendline Slope (1970–2011) 5.52  
1991 271 Trendline Slope (1992–2011) -3.29  
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4. Data Analysis 
Jones and Bixler found the number of general provisions to DoD authorization 
and appropriation increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set, looking 
across the entire 1970 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. 
However, for the relative period of peace the number of general provisions rate of 
increase slowed considerably essentially plateauing and for the period of war the number 
of general provisions declined sharply. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across 
the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation for the 
Cold War increased at a rate of 9.90 provisions per year. The relative period of peace the 
rate slightly increased at 1.51 provisions per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. 
The period of war has a decreasing rate of 7.04 provisions per year not supporting Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, since FY 2007, the number of general provisions has 
steadily decreased to 230 provisions on average (50 provision reduction) comparable 
with late 1980s levels. The last 20 years decreased at 3.29 general provisions per year 
invalidating Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1970–2011) 
increased at 5.52 provisions per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid 
regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the 














Figure 11.   Number of General Provisions (1970–2011) 
J. NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler (1992) assert that the "growth in the size and expertise of 
congressional staffs appears to have played a major role in increasing the 
micromanagement of the DoD budget by Congress" (p. 113). 
According to Jones and Bixler (1992), 
Factors to explain the growth of Congressional staffs include the 
complexity of issues confronted by Congress, self-imposed increases in 
Congressional workloads, the critical need for staff support to accomplish 
anything in Congress, increased activity by members of Congress in 
proposing legislation, expansion in the numbers of committees and 
subcommittees, a steady rise in Congressional-executive political 
confrontation, growth in Congressional reporting requirements, and 
mistrust of executive-branch budget strategy and tactics (p. 118). 
Jones and Bixler (1992) also concluded that the Cold War era data they collected 
regarding the staff size of the House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC and SAC "indicate that 
the growth in the congressional staff has generally coincided with the increase in size of 



































































2. Data Organization 
The data in Tables 12, 13, and 14 were adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) 
Table 5.2 and 5.4 (p. 114, 118) and extended through FY 2005. The data for the number 
of congressional staff members (House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC, and SAC) for FY 
1990–2005 were adapted from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008, p. 110). Due to time 
constraints the authors were unable to extend the data from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 
(2008) through FY 2011. 
3. Data Presentation 
Tables 12, 13, and 14 show the number of congressional staff members (House 
and Senate, HASC and SASC, HAC and SAC respectively) for FY 1957–2005. Figures 
12 (House and Senate), 13 (HASC and SASC), and 14 (HAC and SAC) display the 
congressional staff members broken down into three separate data series with associated 
trend lines. In all three figures, the House is represented by a square symbol while the 
Senate is represented by a triangle symbol. The first data series (blue) represents Jones 
and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green) represents a relative period of peace, 















Table 12.   Total Number of House and Senate Staff Members (FY 1957–2005) 
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1957–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, 
FY 1990–2005) 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY House Senate FY House Senate FY House Senate 
1957 2441 1115 1993 7400 4138 2002 7263 4024 
1967 4055 1749 1995 7186 4247 2003 7048 3998 
1968   1997 7282 4410 2004 6742 3687 
1969   1999 7216 4272 2005 6804 3934 
1970   2001 7209 3994    
1971         
1972 5280 2426     House Senate 









Mean 6803.94 3484.44 
1974    Median 7378.00 3791.50 
1975    R-Squared 0.84 0.88 
1976 6939 3251  Standard Deviation 1436.41 868.20 
1977 6942 3554  Trendline Slope 156.59 97.27 
1978 6944 3268       















Mean 7258.60 4212.20 
1980 7371 3746  Median 7216.00 4247.00 
1981 7487 3945  R-Squared 0.41 0.07 
1982 7511 4041  Standard Deviation 86.73 155.75 
1983 7606 4059  Trendline Slope -17.60 -13.15 
1984 7385 3949       









Mean 6964.25 3910.75 
1986 7920 3744  Median 6926.00 3966.00 
1987 7584 4075  R-Squared 0.83 0.24 
1988 7564 3977  Standard Deviation 238.98 153.89 
1989 7569 3837  Trendline Slope -168.30 -58.10 
1990         
1991 7278 4294  Trendline Slope (1957–2005) 59.78 49.35 
    Trendline Slope (1993–2005) -41.74 -37.23 
4. Data Analysis 
a. House and Senate Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of House and Senate staff members 
increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1957 
to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative 
period of peace the number of House and Senate staff members rate of increase stopped  
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and then slightly decreased. For the period of war the number of staff members 
decreasing rate significantly accelerated. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid 
across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of House staff members for the Cold War significantly 
increased at a rate of 156.59 members per year and the number of Senate staff members 
significantly increased at a rate of 97.27 members per year. For the Cold War, the House 
staff members had a 37% greater growth rate than the Senate. For the relative period of 
peace, the number of House staff members decreased at a rate of 17.60 members per year 
and the number of Senate staff members decreased at a rate of 13.15 members per year, 
which does not support (neutral) Jones and Bixler’s assertion. During the period of war, 
the number of House staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 168.30 members 
per year and the number of Senate staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 
58.10 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. At FY 2005, the 
House and Senate staff members had been reduced to 6,804 and 3,934 staff members 
respectively bringing the House and Senate capacity levels lower when compared to the 
end of the Cold War era (7,278 and 4,294). For the last 20 years the House decreased at 
41.74 staff members per year and the Senate decreased at 37.23 staff members per year 
invalidating Jones and Bixler’s assertion.  
Of note, due to the volume of increase in the House and Senate staff 
members during the Cold War era, the decreasing rate of staff members during the 
relative period of peace and the period of war reduced the overall historical trend (FY 
1957–2005), but the overall historical trend has an increasing rate of the House staff at 
59.78 members per year and the Senate staff at 49.35 members per year as Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control 
exerted over the DoD with the number of House and Senate staff members. 
b. HASC and SASC Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of HASC and SASC staff members 
increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 
to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the number 
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of HASC staff members the relative period of peace stopped the rate of increase from the 
Cold War, reversed, and started decreasing at a significant rate. For the period of war the 
rate of decrease stopped, reversed, and had an accelerated increasing rate. Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when 
looking at the last 20 years. For the number of SASC staff members, the relative period 
of peace rate of increase stopped and plateaued and for the period of war the rate stopped 
plateauing and decreased. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-
year period and is neutral when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of HASC staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate 
of 2.00 members per year and the number of SASC staff members increased at a rate of 
1.09 members per year. During the relative period of peace, the number of HASC staff 
members significantly decreased at a rate of 2.45 members per year not supporting Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. The number of SASC staff member’s plateaus, marginally 
increasing at a rate of 0.23 members per year, which does not support (neutral) Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. During the period of war, the number of HASC staff members 
increased, accelerating at a rate of 3.60 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The number of SASC staff members decreased at a rate of 0.60 members per 
year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. For the last 20 years, the HASC 
decreased at 1.52 staff members per year invalidating Jones and Bixler’s assertion while 
the SASC showed a marginal (neutral) increase of 0.41 members per year, not supporting 
Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), revealed the 
number of HASC staff members increased at 0.67 members per year and the number of 
SASC staff members increased at 0.72 per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains 
valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with 
the number of HASC and SASC staff members. 
c. HAC and SAC Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of HAC and SAC staff members 
increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 
to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the number 
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of HAC staff members, the relative period of peace stopped the rate of increase from the 
Cold War, reversed, and had a significant decreasing rate. For the period of war the rate 
of decrease stopped, reversed, and had a substantially increasing rate. Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and invalid when looking at the last 
20 years. For the number of SAC staff members, the relative period of peace rate of 
increase strengthened and for the period of war the rate significantly increased. Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when 
looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of HAC staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 
5.51 members per year and the number of SAC staff members increased at a rate of 2.01 
members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of HAC staff members 
decreased at a rate of 6.80 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. 
The number of SAC staff members rate of increase amplified during the relative period of 
peace at a 2.58 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. During the 
period of war the number of HAC staff members increased at a rate of 2.40 members per 
year and the number of SAC staff members increased at a significant rate of 5.20 
members per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, the SAC continues to 
add legislative capacity in all three-time periods where the HAC did not (relative period 
of peace). For the last 20 years the HAC decreased at 2.38 staff members per year not 
supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion and the SAC increased at 4.26 staff members per 
year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. For the overall historical trend (FY 1960–
2005), the number of HAC staff increased at 1.99 members per year and the number of 
SAC staff increased at 1.17 members per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains 
valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with 







Table 13.   Number of HASC and SASC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005) (After: 
Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 
1990–2005) 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC FY HASC SASC 
1960 15 23 1993 76 50 2002 46 53 
1963   1994 78 45 2003 54 52 
1964   1995 44 43 2004 54 46 
1965   1996 70 49 2005 58 53 
1966   1997 60 49    
1967   1998 58 45    
1968   1999 57 48    
1969   2000 55 49    
1970 37 19 2001 53 49    
1971         
1972       HASC SASC 









Mean 52.63 34.88 
1974    Median 56.50 33.50 
1975 38 30  R-Squared 0.95 0.79 
1976    Standard Deviation 21.91 11.36 
1977    Trendline Slope 2.00 1.09 
1978         















Mean 61.22 47.44 
1980    Median 58.00 49.00 
1981 49 36  R-Squared 0.36 0.07 
1982    Standard Deviation 11.23 2.46 
1983  41  Trendline Slope -2.45 0.23 
1984         




Mean 53.00 51.00 
1986    Median 54.00 52.50 
1987 70   R-Squared 0.85 0.05 
1988    Standard Deviation 5.03 3.37 
1989 66 51  Trendline Slope 3.60 -0.60 
1990         
1991 82   Trendline Slope (1960–2005) 0.67 0.72 








Table 14.   Number of HAC and SAC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005) (After: Jones 
& Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 1990–
2005) 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY HAC SAC FY HAC SAC FY HAC SAC 
1960 59 31 1993 227 72 2002 158 96 
1963   1994 202 70 2003 156 105 
1964   1995 126 60 2004 162 112 
1965   1996 143 59 2005 164 111 
1966   1997 156 76    
1967   1998 152 70    
1968   1999 158 79    
1969   2000 147 80    
1970 71 42 2001 148 91    
1971         
1972       HAC SAC 









Mean 144.33 68.50 
1974    Median 160.00 79.50 
1975 98 72  R-Squared 0.92 0.85 
1976    Standard Deviation 57.85 20.21 
1977    Trendline Slope 5.51 2.01 
1978         















Mean 162.11 73.00 
1980    Median 152.00 72.00 
1981 127 79  R-Squared 0.34 0.50 
1982    Standard Deviation 31.73 10.01 
1983 160 82  Trendline Slope -6.80 2.58 
1984         









Mean 160.00 106.00 
1986    Median 160.00 108.00 
1987 188   R-Squared 0.72 0.83 
1988    Standard Deviation 3.65 7.35 
1989 196 80  Trendline Slope 2.40 5.20 
1990         
1991 218   Trendline Slope (1960–2005) 1.99 1.17 









Figure 12.   Total Number of House and Senate Staff Members (FY 1957–2005) 
 
















































Figure 14.   Number of HAC and SAC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005) 
K. NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AGENCY STAFF 
1. Assertion 
Jones and Bixler assert that the capabilities and expertise of personnel on 
congressional staffs "has been enhanced by the creation and growth of various legislative 
support agencies charged with providing information and analysis of issues, proposals, 
and policy options to Congress" (p. 120) and that the trend in increased 
micromanagement of the DoD budget by Congress during the Cold War Era was related 
to the increase in the "size and expertise of congressional staffs" (p. 113). 
2. Data Organization 
The data in Table 15 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 5.5 (p. 
123) and extended through FY 2005. The data for the number of congressional support 
agency staff members for FY 1990–2005 were adapted from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 
(2008, p. 110). Due to time constraints the authors were unable to extend the data from 























3. Data Presentation 
Table 15 shows the number of congressional support agency staff members for 
the years 1960–2005. Figures 15, 16, and 17 display the number of congressional support 
agency staff members (CRS, GAO, and CBO respectively) broken down into three 
separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) 
represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a 
relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war. 
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Table 15.   Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff (FY 1960–2005) (After: 
Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 
1990–2005) 
Cold War Era Relative Period of Peace Period of War 
FY CRS GAO CBO FY CRS GAO CBO FY CRS GAO CBO 
1960 183 5074  1992 838 5,062 218 2002 681 3,275 232 
1961    1993 835 4,958 230 2003 692 3,269 236 
1962    1994 740 4,572 218 2004 729 3,252 236 
1963    1995 746 4,342 214 2005 700 3,215 235 
1964    1996 747 3,677 232     
1965 231 4278  1997 726 3,500 232     
1966    1998        
1967    1999 703 3,275 232     
1968    2000        
1969    2001 722 3,155 228     
1970 332 4,704          
1971 386 4,718      CRS GAO CBO 










Mean 711.04 5030.67 214.18 
1973 596 4,908   Median 821.50 5042.00 218.00 
1974 687 5,270   R-Squared 0.73 0.12 0.72 
1975 741 4,905 193  Standard Deviation 218.71 254.38 10.27 
1976 806 5,391 203  Trendline Slope 23.26 10.75 1.72 
1977 789 5,315 201        














 Mean 757.13 4067.63 225.50 
1979 847 5,303 207  Median 743.00 4009.50 229.00 
1980 868 5,196 218  R-Squared 0.66 0.91 0.26 
1981 849 5,182 218  Standard Deviation 51.07 760.37 7.54 
1982 849 5,027 218  Trendline Slope -13.58 -238.00 1.26 
1983 853 4,960 211        









Mean 700.50 3252.75 234.75 
1985 860 5,042 222  Median 696.00 3260.50 235.50 
1986 860 5,019 222  R-Squared 0.35 0.89 0.38 
1987 860 5,016 226  Standard Deviation 20.53 26.99 1.89 
1988 825 5,042 211  Trendline Slope 9.40 -19.70 0.90 
1989 860 5,063 226        
1990 797 5,066 226     CRS GAO CBO 
1991 831 5,054 226  Trendline Slope (1960–2005) 7.81 -43.92 1.10 








Figure 15.   Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CRS (FY 1960–2005) 
 













































Figure 17.   Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CBO (FY 1975–2005) 
4. Data Analysis 
a. CRS Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support CRS staff 
members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the 
entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for 
the relative period of peace the number of CRS staff members continues to plateau from 
the Cold War and then starts a decreasing rate. For the period of war the rate of decrease 
stops, reverses and subsequently increases. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid 
across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of CRS staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 
23.26 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of CRS staff 
members decreased at a rate of 13.58 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. During the period of war the number of CRS staff members increased at a rate 
of 9.40 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, the rapid rate 
of increase of CRS staff members was from 1970 to 1980 (from 330 to 860 members a 
























members plateaued. From the mean of the Cold War through the period of war, there is a 
decreasing percentage of CRS staff members (negative 1.54%), however, due to the rise 
of CRS staff during the Cold War the overall trend is positive. The last 20 years 
decreased at 8.83 CRS staff members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005) increased at a rate of 7.81 CRS 
staff members per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ 
increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of congressional 
support CRS staff members. 
b. GAO Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support GAO staff 
members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the 
entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall decrease in those 50 years. However, for 
the relative period of peace the number of GAO staff members rate of increase stopped 
and started a significantly decreasing rate while during the period of war the rate of 
decrease slowed. Jones and Bixler’s assertion is invalid across the full 50-year period and 
is invalid when looking at the last 20 years. 
The number of GAO staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 
10.75 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of GAO staff 
members significantly decreased at a rate of 238.00 members per year not supporting 
Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Overall, GAO staff was significantly reduced by 19% 
during the relative period of peace. During the period of war the number of GAO staff 
members decreased at a rate of 19.70 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion. The last 20 years decreased at 3.29 GAO staff members not supporting Jones 
and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), decreased at 7.81 
GAO staff members per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion is not valid regarding 
Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of 
congressional support GAO staff members. 
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c. CBO Staff Members 
Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support CBO staff 
members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the 
entire 1960 to 2005 period, there been an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for 
the relative period of peace the number of CBO staff members rate of increase slowed 
and for the period of war the rate of increase continued to slow. Jones and Bixler’s 
assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at 
the last 20 years. 
The number of CBO staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 
1.72 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of CBO staff 
members increased at a slower rate of 1.26 members per year supporting Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. During the period of war the number of CBO staff members rate of 
growth continued to slow at a rate of 0.90 members per year supporting Jones and 
Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years increased at 1.22 CBO staff members per year 
supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), 
increased at 1.10 CBO staff members per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains 
valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with 
the number of congressional support CBO staff members. 
L. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapter III looked at Jones and Bixler’s assertions regarding some of the methods 
Congress utilizes to control the defense budget, specifically legislative, oversight, and 
capacity factors. The data analysis supports the majority of Jones and Bixler’s assertions 
when extended from the Cold War including the relative period of peace and the period 
of war. Chapter IV will reveal this thesis’s results and recommendations for further study. 
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The primary research question addressed by this thesis was to determine whether 
the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid beyond their 
period of study. Current congressional control literature was reviewed, Jones and Bixler’s 
assertions were given, and data was collected, organized, presented, and analyzed to 
determine if their assertions remained valid, invalid or were neutral. Table 16 summarizes 
the chapter three analysis. 
Looking at the literature review during the past 20 years of this study, the authors 
conclude Congress has increased their capacity to control the Department of Defense 
budget through the use of statutory, nonstatutory, and other controls.  However, there 
appears to be a limit to this legislative capacity. The majority of various DoD 
authorization and appropriation bills and committee reports have seen peaks in capacity 
levels followed by plateaus or reductions. Formal and informal information collected by 
Congress (oversight) has seen capacity increases but the type of information collected 
appears to be changing (shift in witness category called to testify). Overall, Congress is 
exercising more control from the Cold War era through this period of study. 
If one looks across the full period of study, the majority (90%) of Jones and 
Bixler’s assertions evaluated remain valid. However, looking at only the last 20 years, 
63% of their assertions are either invalid or neutral. For the relative period of peace, 68% 
of their assertions are either invalid or neutral and for the period of war, 47% are either 
invalid or neutral. The authors inferred from the data that during the last 20 years there 
has not been a general increase, rather there has been a change in Congress' use of 
statutory, nonstatutory, and other forms of congressional budget controls to control the 
DoD budget. 
The purpose of this thesis was to extend Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data to 
the most current, readily available data. This thesis is not a study to determine the 
specific reasons why congressional control measures could be changing, but this thesis 
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analyzed the past 20 years of appropriate data applying the results to Jones and Bixler’s 
Cold War data. However, this thesis will present recommendations for further study 
resulting from trends identified during analysis that could lead to those reasons. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The authors of the thesis had one limitation during the data collection phase: lack 
of available data for study elements.  
Jones and Bixler (1992) and the authors were unable to locate reliable data for the 
following: 
• HASC and SASC hearings (no data from 1973–1996) 
• HASC and SASC witnesses (no data from 1973–1996) 
• Congressional staffing (data not updated post-2005) 
The data collected for the HASC and SASC hearings and witnesses accounted for 
less than 50% of the total data available. Readers are cautioned to limit any conclusions 
































Number of Pages in Defense 
Authorization Bills      
Number of Pages in Defense 
Appropriations Bills      
Number of Pages in HASC 
Defense Authorization Report      
Number of Pages in SASC 
Defense Authorization Report      
Number of Pages in HAC 
Defense Appropriation Report      
Number of Pages in SAC 
Defense Appropriation Report      
Number of HASC Hearings 
      
Number of SASC Hearings 
      
Number of Witnesses Before 
the HASC and SASC      
Number of General Provisions 
      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: House      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: Senate      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: HASC      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: SASC      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: HAC      
Number of Congressional 
Staff Members: SAC      
Number of Congressional 
Support Agency Staff: CRS      
Number of Congressional 
Support Agency Staff: GAO      
Number of Congressional 
Support Agency Staff: CBO      
  Legend:  Remains Valid 
    Invalid 
    Neutral 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Congressional Control Spike During 1980s 
Some of the measures changed at a time other than the strategically important 
periods of time defined in this study and may be more affected by other factors regarding 
changes in congressional control starting in the mid 1980s. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 11 display 
relatively flat trend lines until the 1980s when they started to increase sharply. Future 
research should explore the reason(s) for the increase in the 1980s congressional control, 
specifically as to whether the Reagan administration DoD buildup may have been 
responsible. There have been other periods of war and defense buildups without an 
increase in congressional control/legislation, but it could be a factor. 
Additionally, research should explore whether this change was related to 
circumstances that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 (Pub. L.99-433) or the rise in absolute and relative defense spending levels. 
Both occurred at approximately the same time as the shift in the data. 
2. Congressional Capacity: Staff Size 
Data analysis revealed trends regarding congressional capacity, specifically the 
number of House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC, and SAC staff members and the number 
of congressional support staff members (CRS, GAO, and CBO). 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 reveal that the majority of congressional staff sizes peaked 
at the end of the Cold War with the SASC and SAC being the two exceptions. Since the 
data for the House and Senate trend differently, a possible explanation is the shift in 
power in the House in the mid-1990s and the new Republican majority’s goal under the 
Contract with America. 
Congressional support staff (Figures 15 and 16, CRS and GAO) follows the same 
decreasing trend in staff size following the Cold War, while the CBO (Figure 17) staff 
size increased in all periods. Future studies should analyze why most staffs decreased 
post-Cold War, despite an increase in overall legislative output. Further, research should 
explore why one staff agency, the CBO, grew while the other staff agencies, the GAO 
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and CRS, experienced a steady decline in size. It is likely that as the size of the defense 
budget relative to the overall budget decreased, factors other than defense primarily 
determine their size. Perhaps the shift in emphasis on staffs indicates more policy 
(domestic and defense) is exercised through the budget than other legislative functions. 
3. Congressional Capacity: Legislative Throughput  
Further research should explore whether the steady trend in the size of bills and 
reports has slowed or reversed due to changes in committee and member staff size. It 
seems reasonable to assume that a smaller staff would produce less legislative output. 
Looking at individual staffs and legislative outputs (taking total bill type volume divided 
by total corresponding staff size) would be useful when comparing staff differences in 
output. Both the HASC and SASC on average produce more than eight pages of 
legislation per staff member more than the HAC and SAC. A snapshot during the period 
of war reveals the HASC and SASC averaged 11.36 pages per staff member while the 
HAC and SAC averaged 3.05 pages per staff member. Similar ratios are applicable for 
each individual period (relative period of peace; period of war) and the entire timeframe. 
Are authorization committees more “productive” than appropriation committees when 
writing legislation? Is it significant that the SAC is more “productive” than the HAC 
while the HASC is more “productive” than the SASC? 
4. Congressional Oversight: HASC and SASC Witnesses 
The data reveals changes in the types of witnesses called to testify. Although the 
total number of DoD witnesses has remained relatively constant over for the entire 
period, the number of non-defense government witnesses decreased by 9% and non-
government witnesses increased by 11% since the end of the Cold War. Further research 
should inquire why the legislature has relied more on non-government witnesses, which 
industries or interests these witnesses represented, and what information they provided 
Congress. Such a study should also look at whether there has been a change in the type of 
government witnesses. 
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5. Congressional Oversight: Legislation Page Count 
The HASC and SASC authorization bills (Figures 3 and 4) showed an increasing 
trend during the Cold War era and relative period of peace, but the increase stops and 
starts a decreasing trend during the period of war. The HAC and SAC appropriation bills 
(Figure 5 and 6) both showed increasing trends for the Cold War era and period of war 
but differed during the relative period of peace. During the relative period of peace the 
HAC trend plateaued while the SAC decreased sharply. The sizes of the authorization 
and appropriation bills trended in opposite directions for the past 20 years. Appropriation 
bills appear to follow levels of defense budget authority but defense authorizations bills 
do not. Additionally, the shape of the appropriation bills appears to correlate positively 
with the amount of budget authority for defense spending but authorization bills do not. 
Further inquiry should look for causes for the differences between the respective bills. 
6. Data Analysis: Additional Jones and Bixler (1992) Chapters 
During this study the authors focused primarily on the assertions made in Jones 
and Bixler (1992) Chapters 4 and 5. Future research should extend other portions of 
Jones and Bixler's analysis, looking deeper into the trends and assertions made in other 
areas of their research.  
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